

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Document No. 5 February 1952 1

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/TRS

SUBJECT: Training Development Staff
Staff Study INO CHANGE in Class. ☐☐ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 28 FEB 1978 By: [REDACTED]

25X1

1. The Problem.

The covert offices of CIA require, for a steady increase in their operational effectiveness, a corresponding increase in the total effectiveness of their personnel. Other things being equal, this may be accomplished by (a) maintaining the present level of average individual efficiency and increasing the number of persons employed by the covert offices, or (b) improving the level of average individual efficiency while the total number of employees remains constant, or (c) by increasing both average efficiency and the number of persons employed.

An increase in average individual operational efficiency can be attained either by (a) every individual gathering operational experience and learning therefrom; (b) by a sufficient number of individuals learning enough from their experiences to outweigh the losses in total competence arising from normal attrition; (c) the accumulation of experience, the synthesizing of it, and the dissemination of the conclusions arrived at in an internally consistent, properly formulated, practical, and comprehensible form to both new and experienced personnel which will enable those exposed to such knowledge to benefit to some degree from it. The primary mission of TRS is to provide the system for disseminating such knowledge to properly designated recipients. The problem is that of ensuring (a) that TRS has such knowledge available to it at all times and (b) that it is coherently, consistently, and effectively presented.

Assumptions.

1. TDS of TRS has been created for the purpose of solving the problem stated above.
2. The authority and support required by TDS to perform this task will be forthcoming when the necessary specific statement of requirements concerning both elements -- authority and support -- have been made clear.
3. Continuing authoritative guidance at a proper level will be available at all times to TDS as the responsible staff representative of the DD/TRS.
4. The covert offices, DDP, (ADDB, [?]) and DCI are in agreement with the statement of the problem presented above and with the first three assumptions.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

Facts Bearing on the Problem.

1. Since the creation of the covert training functions within CIA the determination and development of the proper substantive content of training courses has been made by the covert training unit itself in accordance with the general statements of requirements submitted by the covert offices. The approval of this content by the covert offices has in almost every instance been tacitly given; in a limited number of instances specific objections have been raised to the continued use of certain material, and the appropriate modifications have been introduced by TRS as rapidly as possible. A precedent of at least three years practice has been established by which:

- a. The covert offices state a requirement in general terms.
 - b. TRS develops material to meet the need.
 - c. The covert offices tacitly approve or expressly disapprove the doctrine enunciated.
2. During this time TRS has developed:
- a. A course of orientation and instruction in the basic elements of intelligence work (the BOC).
 - b. A basic course in the fundamentals of clandestine operation.
 - c. An advanced general course covering the basic, clandestine mission, methods, policies, and procedures of the agency.
 - d. A course on administrative procedures and practices of the covert offices and their field missions.
 - e. A general course in paramilitary activity.
 - f. Specialized courses in:



25X1

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

25X1C

Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP57-00012A000200020001-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP57-00012A000200020001-8

SECRET

-5-

11. TRS has also recognized that its ever-increasing demands upon guest speakers has placed heavy burdens upon busy staff officers, and that the integration of such presentations into a course of instruction is extremely difficult to accomplish.

Discussion:

1. To perform effectively a system must be established by which TRS is:
 - ✓ a. Regularly informed of advance operational plans of the covert offices in order that training development may be guided accordingly.
 - ✓ b. Kept abreast of current and anticipated substantive content requirements for training.
 - ✓ c. In a position to request and secure authoritative rulings on operational policy questions and authentication of its own product designed to transmit such policy and doctrine to students.
 - ✓ d. In a position to conduct, under adequate security safeguards, research into recent operational experience of the covert offices.
 - e. Authorized to participate, in an advisory and consultative capacity, in any research or developmental work dealing with operational doctrine, standards, techniques, or related matters carried on by any of the covert offices, unless such work relates exclusively to a single area division's problems. In the latter case, TRC must be permitted to make appropriate use of the end product.
2. If the work of the Training Development Staff is to maintain a suitably high level of competence, it must be provided with the best available personnel. Six of the posts within the Staff are of critical importance and require staffing with persons of proven operational judgment, for it is upon their shoulders that the full burden of course material selection, development and review will fall. These posts must be viewed as major factors contributing to the overall operational efficiency of the covert offices; they may also be considered as posts which provide a unique opportunity for senior staff personnel of the agency assigned to them to round out their knowledge in preparation for future assignments to executive posts of considerable responsibility within the covert component of the agency. The rotation policy should be rigidly adhered to so far as these posts are concerned.

The operational research staff must also consist of competent personnel. In this case it is strongly recommended that the assignment be, in ordinary cases, limited to a one year period, and that the posts be considered as a major career development step for those assigned to them. It is strongly urged that

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

-6-

the staffing of both of these groups be given special attention by any career management committee working within the covert offices of the agency, the first group of posts being reserved for potential staff, division, and major station chiefs, and the second for potential branch and country desk chiefs, and senior staff and operations officers.

Recommendations:

1. DDP, ADSO, and ADPC should be requested to authorize TDS as the representative of DD/TRS to:

- a. Have access to the Plans Staffs of the covert offices.
- b. Assign senior members of its staff to attend as observers the operations staff conferences of both OSO and OPC.
- c. Have free access, for exploratory purposes only, to the operational records of both offices.
- d. Select, in consultation with, and with the approval of, Operations and Plans Chiefs, operational research projects and representative cases for detailed study.
- e. Conduct, under security safeguards, satisfactory to the staff and division chiefs concerned, research into selected current operational problems and recent cases.
- f. Conduct intensive debriefings of any persons returning from field assignments, including, where possible, covert agent personnel.
- g. Have access to field station operational records when such access is necessary in connection with an approved research project or case study.
- h. Prepare and submit for authentication by the appropriate assistant director or directors, the collated results of operational research projects and evaluated and annotated case histories.
- i. Submit for consideration and approval syntheses of conflicting operational doctrine relating to two or more of the covert offices when such conflict cannot be resolved by joint consultation with representatives of the offices concerned.

2. Career management authorities in the covert offices should be requested to designate the posts in TDS as key development posts, and should be asked to maintain a special roster of candidates on a long term availability forecast basis.

SECRET


SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

-7-

3. Agreements concerning coordination of effort should be developed with:

a. Standards and Techniques/Ops Staff/OPC.

b. Support and Protection Branch 

25X1

c. War Plans Div./OPC.

d. FY Plans Div./OPC.

e. Any other unit currently engaged in, or planning to engage in, operational research, and approved by the Assistant Directors.

4. Division chiefs and staff chiefs should be requested to designate a senior member of their operations staff and/or plans staff to serve as a training development officer to ensure continuing and effective liaison on research and study projects.



25X1A9A

Chief, TDS

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION


SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

(KSC.)

5. When top echelon approval of the TDS charter has been procured and the first product (The Basic Agent Training Manual) is complete, a meeting of staff and division chiefs should be called to:

- a. Give them the first product;
- b. Explain the aim, purpose, and method of TDS operations; and
- c. Introduce the members of the DDS panel of experts -- which will, it is hoped, be complete by then!



25X1

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL